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history of the statute, and the practical application of it, the opposite
implication.
Unless Congress, in each regulation issued, expressly states its intent
to exclude the power of the state or to allow it in the interstices of the
federal law, the courts will continue to be faced with this problem of inter-
pretation. It has been urged that the Court adopt either one of these
presumptions in order to have a uniform rule.16 In any case there is tl~e
possibility of Congress "overruling" the Supreme Court by subsequent leg-
islation. Upon several occasions decisions have been followed by statutes
which laid down a rule different from that expressed by the Court.'7 It is
interesting to note that in most of these cases, Congress has acted to
return to the states powers which the Court had taken away in construing
the statute. We may speculate as to what action Congress may take in'
connection with the instant case.'
8
J. D. H.
MECHANIcs' LImNS-JUDGMENTS---STATUTE OF LiMITATIONS--Missouri].
-A sheriff, in execution of a mechanic's lien judgment, sold two lots, the
titles to which had previously been acquired by the appellants through a
sale under a deed of trust. The sheriff's sales were on July 21, 1938, in
pursuance of the executions issued upon judgments and decrees establishing
a mechanic's lien. The decrees on the lots were entered in January and
April, 1934. The appellants sought to cancel the sheriff's sale, contending
that under Missouri statutes1 the liens created by the judgments and decrees
16. Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power (1940) 27 Va. L.
Rev. 1.
17. In Pennsylvania v. The Wheeling and Belmont Bridge Co. (U. S.
1851) 13 How. 518, a bridge authorized by the state of Virginia was de-
clared illegal as an obstruction to interstate commerce. (1852) 10 Stat.
112, c. 112, declared it to be a valid structure, and in Pennsylvania v.
Wheeling and Belmont Bridge Co. (U. S. 1856) 18 How. 421, the Court
recognized the effect of the statute, and reversed the former opinion. Liesy
v. Hardin (1890) 135 U. S. 100 held that a state could not prevent the
interstate sale of liquor within its boundaries in the original package. The
Wilson Act (1890) 26 Stat. 313, c. 728, 27 U. S. C. A. §121, gave this
power to the states, and in In re Rahrer (1891) 140 U. S. 545 the reversing
effect of the statute was recognized. In both of these cases, the silence of
Congress was interpreted as an intent that the field be free of state regula-
tion. Congress acted after the interpretation by the court, to express a
different intent. See also Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland Ry.
Co. (1917) 242 U. S. 311 in connection with the Webb-Kenyon Act (1913)
37 Stat. 699, c. 90, 27 U. S. C. A. §122.
In Oregon-Washington Ry. & Navigation Co. v. Washington (1926) 270
U. S. 87 the Court inferred from an act of Congress (1912) 37 Stat. 315,
c. 308, 7 U. S. C. A. §161, an intent to exclude state quarantine regulations.
Within three months, Congress amended the act to refute this implication,
and allow the action. 44 Stat. 250, c. 135, 7 U. S. C. A. §161.
18. To date there seems to have been no effort to effect a change in the
rule set forth by the court.
1. R. S. Mo. (1939) §§1269, 1270.
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had expired three years after the entry of judgment i. e. in 1937, and no
attempt had been made to revive them. Held, for appellee; mechanic's lien
judgments are in rem, created specially against the property in question,
and continue for ten years without the necessity of revival. Rosenzweig v.
FergusoM2
In Missouri a judgment is a lien on the real estate of the person against
whom it is rendered3 and the lien continues in force for three years com-
mencing on the day of the rendition of the judgment;4 however, it may be
revived by scire facia s at any time within ten years after the entry of it. 5
Such judgments are in personamn.5 The proceedings of a mechanic's lien
suit are the same as those of an ordinary civil action,7 and may be com-
menced by either personal service8 or by constructive notice9 in accordance
with the Missouri code of civil procedure. A judgment in the latter case
should be issued as a general one against the party who ordered the work
and as a special one against the property.'0 If the mechanic's lien judg-
ment cannot be satisfied by the party who ordered the work, it may be
satisfied by the execution of the lien against the property. This execution
is had by a special fleri facias," with which we are here concerned. Since
the purpose of the mechanic's lien judgment is to establish a lien against
the improved property12 and execution is had by special fieri facias, the
execution proceedings are considered to be in rem.'s
The general statutes are silent with respect to the duration of liens of
judgments for special benefits, but the Missouri Supreme Court has held
that judgments for special benefits and tax assessments reduced to judg-
ments are judgments in rem'A and that they do not expire in three years
2. (Mo. 1941) 158 S. W. (2d) 124.
3. R. S. Mo. (1939) §1269.
4. R. S. Mo. (1939) §1270.
5. B. S. Mo. (1939) §1271.
6. Schwab v. City of St. Louis (1925) 310 Mo. 116, 141, 274 S. W. 1058,
1066 "It is evident that the purpose of section 1555 was to make judgments
in personam a lien on the real estate of the judgment debtor * *
7. R. S. Mo. (1939) §3554.
8. R. S. Mo. (1939) §3560.
9. R. S. Mo. (1939) §3559.
10. Gill, The Missouri Law of Title to Real Property (3d ed. 1931) 717,
§1627. Williams v. Porter (1873) 51 Mo. 441; Schmeiding v. A. W. Ewing
(1874) 57 Mo. 78; Hassett v. Rust (1876) 64 Mo. 325; Lowry-Miller Lum-
ber Co. v. Dean (1932) 226 Mo. App. 783, 47 S. W. (2d) 164.
11. R. S. Mo. (1939) §3561.
12. R. S. Mo. (1939) §3546.
13. "The proceeding to foreclose a mechanic's lien in a proceeding in
rem, founded on statute, not in personam, and operates only as a foreclosure,
and not as an action for the collection of a debt." Annotation 13 L. R. A.
706. See also, 36 A. J. 240, Davis v. Bilsland (U. S. 1874) 18 Wall. 659,
21 L. Ed. 969; J. C. Vreeland Building Co. v. Knickerbocker Sugar Refinery
Co. (1907) 75 N. J. L. 551, 68 Atl. 215, 127 Am. St. Rep. 812, 15 Ann. Cas.
1083; Hunt v. Darling (1904) 26 R. I. 480, 59 Atl. 398, 69 L. R. A. 497,
8 Ann. Cas. 1098.
14. Schwab v. City of St. Louis supra note 5 at 310 Mo. 142, 274 S. W.
1066, "Judgments in proceedings for the collection of local assessments and
special benefits are judgments in rem, not in personam and can only be for
the enforcing of the lien against the particular property assessed."
19421
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but in ten.' 5 The same court has also held that execution on a vendor's lien
may be had at any time within ten years. 6 The court in the principal case
draws an analogy between special benefit judgments and mechanic's lien
judgments in that they can only be liens against the particular property
involved and that they are judgments in rem. The court held unanimously
that since a lien for a judgment for special benefits runs for ten years, the
same limitation should apply to a mechanic's lien judgment.
R. R. N., JR.
PATENTS - DIRECT INFRINGEMIENT - DEFENSES - ATTEMPT OF PATENT
OWNER TO ESTABLISH MONOPOLY OVER UNPATENTED MATERIAL BY MEANS OF
PATENT - [United States]. - Respondent (plaintiff in the lower court)
patented machines for depositing salt tablets, used by the canning industry
for flavoring canned foods. The machines were leased to canners, and the
leases specified that the lessee should use only respondent's unpatented salt
tablets in the leased machines. Respondent sought an injunction and an
accounting for direct infringement of the patent by petitioner, a competitor
in the salt business. Petitioner set up the defense that the condition in
the leases was contrary to public policy and prohibited respondent from
suing for infringement. Held, equity will not enjoin the infringement of a
patent where the holder is using that patent to restrain trade or create a
monopoly over and above that of the patent itself. Morton Salt Co. v.
G. S. Suppiger Co.'
The principal case makes explicit a limitation on the legitimate use of
patents which may be implied from earlier decisions. A patent grants an
exclusive right to make, use and vend the particular device described in
the patent,2 but it does not carry with it the right to a monopoly not within
the grant.3 It is the general rule that courts, particularly courts of equity,
15. Gill, op. cit. supra note 9, at 636, §1421. Boyd v. Ellis (1891) 107
Mo. 394, 18 S. W. 29; Fleckenstien v. Baxter (1893) 114 Mo. 493, 21 S. W.
852; George W. Watson v. The Keystone Iron Works Co. (1904) 70 Kan.
43, 74 Pac. 269; Moore v. Ogden (1880) 35 Ohio St. 430; Byssel v. St. Louis
(1902) 168 Mo. 607, 68 S. W. 893; City of St. Louis v. Annex Realty Co.
(1903) 175 Mo. 63, 74 S. W. 961, Schwab v. City of St. Louis (1925) 310
Mo. 116, 274 S. W. 1058; supra note 6, Wayland v. Kansas City (1928)
321 Mo. 654, 12 S. W. (2d) 438.
16. Hockaday v. Lawther (1885) 17 Mo. App. 636.
1. (1942) 62 S. Ct. 402, 86 L. Ed. 317.
2. These rights are sanctioned by the Unitid States Constitution, Art. I,
§8, cl. 8, which reads, "The Congress shall have power * * * (8) To
promote the progress of science and the useful arts, by securing for limited
times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writ-
ings and discoveries." They are expressly provided for by statute (35
U. S. C. A. passim).
3. Strictly speaking, a patentee has no right to do anything under the
patent grant, but only the right to exclude others from doing certain things.
However, this is the language ordinarily used. Interstate Circuit v. United
States (1939) 306 U. S. 208; Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States (1940)
309 U. S. 436.
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